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I. Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond 
initial seizure. 
  
II. If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth Amendment 
protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial seizure 
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The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts 




STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010.  (R. at 16).  Petitioner filed his 
petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010.  (R. at 17).  This Court granted the petition on 
October 7, 2010.  (R. at 18).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000).  A 
district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed 













STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
On September 23, 2008, Petitioner, Beau Radley, was pulled over by Fair County Police 
Officer, John Marlin, for suspicion of driving under the influence.  (R. at 3).  When Radley 
refused to take a breathalyzer test, Marlin handcuffed Radley and drove him to the Fair County 
Police Station.  (R. at 3).  Upon arrival, Marlin escorted Radley to the booking room and 
transferred Radley into the custody of Fair County Police Officer, Respondent Arthur Goode.  
(R. at 3).  When Marlin left the room, Goode began calling Radley “scum” and “white trash,” to 
which Radley did not respond.  (R. at 3).  Goode tightly recuffed Radley after the booking 
process and when Radley complained, Goode did not loosen the cuffs. (R. at 3).  At this point, 
Marlin came into the booking room and Radley again complained about his tight cuffs.  (R. at 3).  
Marlin checked his cuffs and loosened them, leaving Goode alone to escort Radley to a holding 
cell.  (R. at 3).  In the holding cell, Goode pushed Radley to the ground and kneed Radley in the 
back, threatening that he “shouldn’t have embarrassed him” and if Goode had to come back 
Radley would “regret it.”  (R. at 3).  When Radley was sure Goode was off duty, he reported the 
abuse and was taken to the hospital for examination.  (R. at 3).  Radley’s injuries included a cut 
lip, bruised wrists, and bruising along his jaw from being pushed to the ground while his hands 
were still cuffed behind his back.  (R. at 4).  
 On February 1, 2009, Radley filed claims against the Fair County Police Department and 
Officer Arthur Goode, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections against excessive force by an officer under color of law.  (R. at 4).  
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  (R. at 5).  The District Court for the Southern District of Fair, 
in granting the Respondents’ motion, held that Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond 
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initial seizure, but stops once the detainee is transferred out of the arresting officer’s custody.  
(R. at 13).  The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.  (R. at 
16).  On May 15, 2010, Radley filed a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 
which was granted.  (R. at 17, 18).   




 In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court refused to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment provides arrestees with protection against the 
deliberate use of excessive force beyond the point when arrest ends and pretrial detention begins. 
However, in holding the Fourth Amendment applied to abuse occurring after a detained citizen 
was in handcuffs and in a police car, the Graham Court implied that seizure is a continuing event 
that does not end as soon as a suspect is first restrained. 
The Graham Court held whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applies depends 
upon whether a plaintiff’s legal status is classified as a person undergoing seizure or a pretrial 
detainee. An arrestee’s legal status does not immediately change after officers bring a suspect 
under their control, since there has been no legal determination that he should enter the pretrial 
system. Therefore, excessive force experienced while under the seizure and control of the 
officers should be properly analyzed under the continuing seizure approach, which asserts the 
Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond the point of initial seizure.  
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment under the continuing seizure approach allows 
arrestees the protection intended historically by the Framers of the Constitution. The Fourth 
Amendment’s clear textual protection for arrestees against governmental behavior is a more 
appropriate constitutional amendment for purposes of excessive force analysis, rather than the 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s more generalized notion of substantive due process. The Framers of 
the Constitution wrote the Bill of Rights to guarantee protection in the area of criminal procedure 
and explicitly drafted the Fourth Amendment to address pretrial deprivations of liberty. The 
Supreme Court previously held that Fourteenth Amendment protection should be reserved for 
claims lacking enumerated rights under a specific amendment, therefore the Fourteenth 
Amendment should not be applied when doing so would duplicate protection that a more specific 
constitutional provision already bestows. Thus, since the Fourth Amendment directly addresses 
protection of an accused’s rights, the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable.  
 Since Graham, the majority of courts adopted the continuing seizure doctrine when 
interpreting arrestees’ constitutional protection against use of excessive force. The Second, 
Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts correctly determined that Fourth 
Amendment protection extends beyond the initial point when the officer gains control over the 
arrestee. In the lower court opinion, the Fifteenth Circuit also correctly agreed the Fourth 
Amendment continues to protect arrestees beyond their initial seizure.  
II.  
 The Fourth Amendment mandates protection extend until Radley has been arraigned or 
formally charged because until it is determined he was lawfully arrested, there have been no 
evidentiary findings to warrant the deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Under the 
continuing seizure approach, Radley should not lose his Fourth Amendment rights until 
arraignment, despite the fact that he was arrested and in a holding cell, because his arrest was 
made without a warrant. Since Radley was arrested without a warrant, there has been no judicial 
determination by an unbiased magistrate that sufficient evidence exists to indict Radley and enter 
him into the pretrial system. Until a formal hearing occurs, Radley could be released from police 
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custody before a case is set for trial, so depriving his Fourth Amendment rights prior to this 
procedure is unjustified. A probable cause hearing or arraignment is a judicial proceeding that 
affects the legal status of Radley and officially enters him into the pretrial system. Thus, 
extending the Fourth Amendment’s protection until this change in legal status occurs is 
consistent with the Graham Court’s requirement that the legal status of the plaintiff determine 
which amendment governs his excessive force claims. When looking at the circuit courts’ 
opinions where a plaintiff was held pursuant to a warrantless arrest, there is a consensus that the 
Fourth Amendment is the correct constitutional standard for excessive force against arrestees 
prior to arraignment or a probable cause hearing. 
 The arresting officer requirement should not be this Court’s bright line rule because its 
application is arbitrary, basing a citizen’s constitutional protection on something as haphazard as 
police station protocol. Determining which amendment applies must depend on a constitutional 
change in the arrestee’s status that would warrant a change in protection. If Radley’s Fourth 
Amendment protection abruptly ends merely because the arresting officer handed him over once 
they reached the police station, his Fourth Amendment rights have been deprived without the 
requisite change in his legal status. Furthermore, continuing to apply the arresting officer rule 
would promote unequal application of the law to abused arrestees who are detained in counties 
with different procedures of when the arresting officer transfers custody. Therefore, since the 
arresting officer rule has no constitutional basis and would provide inconsistent protection, this 
Court should decline to follow the Fifteenth Circuit’s decision to establish a bright line rule 




I. BECAUSE FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE SUPPORTS PROTECTION 
AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE EXTENDING BEYOND INITIAL SEIZURE, THIS 
COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT RADLEY’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
CONTINUED BEYOND THE POINT IN TIME WHEN HE WAS TAKEN INTO 
POLICE CUSTODY.  
A. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court left undecided the exact moment in time 
when seizure ends, but implied seizure extends beyond the time when the accused 
was first taken into custody.  
 
 
Section 1983 was enacted by Congress to afford a remedy for citizens deprived of 
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by a government official’s abuse of his position. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).  The threshold issue in every § 1983 inquiry is to determine which of 
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated in order to determine the standard to be used 
when analyzing a plaintiff’s excessive force claim.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 
(1989).  Prior to conviction for a crime, the two primary sources of constitutional protection 
against physical abuse by government officials are the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against deprivation 
of liberty without due process of the law.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; see U.S.CONST. amends. IV 
& XIV, § 1. 
Determining which constitutional amendment the court should apply depends upon 
whether a plaintiff is classified as a person undergoing seizure or a pretrial detainee.  Graham, 
490 U.S. at 395.  A plaintiff who is abused while being seized can invoke protection of his rights 
under the Fourth Amendment, causing the excessive force to be analyzed under the objective 
reasonableness standard, which inquires whether the officers’ actions were objectively 
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
underlying intent or motivation.  Id. at 396-97.  
6 
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial detainee from 
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.  Id. at 395 n.10. The applicable standard 
when analyzing governmental abuse under the Fourteenth Amendment is whether the force was 
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for 
the very purpose of causing harm.  Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1045 (1994).  When applying Fourteenth Amendment, courts will also consider 
if the officer’s conduct “shocks the conscience.”  Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1168 n.4 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1030 (1997).   
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment to excessive 
force occurring during arrest, investigatory stops, or other seizures, but explicitly refused to 
answer whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against 
the use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention 
begins.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.  It is significant that the Graham Court did not limit its 
Fourth Amendment application to the citizen’s arrest, instead focusing its analysis on the seizure 
of the accused.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.  By applying the Fourth Amendment to the abuse 
occurring after the police officers put the plaintiff in handcuffs and shoved him into a police car, 
the Graham Court implicitly held arrest is a continuing event that does not end as soon as a 
suspect is first restrained.  United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1997); see 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.  The Graham decision additionally shows that handcuffing does not 
end seizure for purposes of Fourth Amendment rights in excessive force claims.  Johnstone, 107 
F.3d at 205; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. 
The gap of constitutional protection between arrest and arraignment left by the Graham 
Court created a split of constitutional interpretations in the lower circuit courts of when the 
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Fourth Amendment’s protection over seizure ends and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection 
over pretrial detainees begins.  Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000).  
B. Supported by the majority of circuit courts, the continuing seizure approach views 
an arrestee as remaining under seizure beyond arrest, and retaining this legal status 
provides the appropriate constitutional protection against excessive force from law 
enforcement officers as intended by the text of the Fourth Amendment.   
 
 
This Court should adhere to the Fifteenth Circuit’s application of the continuing seizure 
approach, in holding that Radley’s Fourth Amendment rights extended beyond initial seizure. 
The continuing seizure approach views seizure as a continuum, instead of the particular moment 
of initial restraint.  Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 206.  By interpreting seizure as extending beyond 
arrest, any abuse occurring during this continuing seizure would be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (excessive force occurring during seizure is 
protected by Fourth Amendment). 
The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits adopted this constitutional 
interpretation, holding the Fourth Amendment applies beyond arrest, extending until either the 
arrestee leaves the custody of the arresting officer or attends a formal hearing.  See, e.g., Aldini v. 
Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2010) (dividing line between Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment’s zones of protection occurs at the probable cause hearing); Wilson, 209 F.3d at 716 
(Fourth Amendment applies not only to the act of arrest, but to any subsequent force used against 
an arrestee); Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 206 (seizure continues after arrest); Pierce v. Multnomah 
Cnty., Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (warrantless, post-
arrest, pre-arraignment custody governed by Fourth Amendment); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 
1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (Fourth Amendment protects against abuse to arrestee detained 
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without a warrant); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Fourth Amendment 
protection applies while arrestee is in the arresting officer’s custody).  
Only a small number of circuits declined to follow the continuing seizure doctrine, 
instead viewing seizure as a single act of detention, not a continuing event.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 
1163.  The Fourth and Fifth Circuits interpreted the Fourth Amendment as only applying to the 
initial decision to detain the accused and not to the conditions of their custody.  Id.  These 
circuits held that once a person is lawfully arrested they become a pretrial detainee and are 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Brothers, 28 F.3d at 455; 
accord Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905 (1993). 
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits also held the Fourteenth Amendment applies to excessive 
force against arrestees; however, these circuits were indecisive in their application of 
constitutional standards, applying both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to detainees in 
the gap period.  See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490-92 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding 
mistreatment claims of arrestees are governed by the Due Process Clause, but then applying the 
Fourth Amendment standard to a post-arrest, pre-arraignment plaintiff’s excessive force claim). 
Applying the Fourth Amendment past initial seizure provides arrestees the protection 
against excessive force that is constitutionally most appropriate.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.  The 
Framers drafted the Bill of Rights to unequivocally restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by 
the government in the areas of criminal procedure.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).  
As part of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was specifically drafted to protect against 
pretrial deprivations of liberty.  Id. at 274.  Conversely, the Fourteenth Amendment has most 
often been interpreted in matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, or other unenumerated 
rights.  Id. at 272.  The Supreme Court held that where an amendment provides an explicit 
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textual source of protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment, 
not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these 
claims.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.  Therefore, since the Fourth Amendment provides specific 
constitutional protection to arrestees, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment would unnecessarily 
duplicate this authority.  Albright, 510 U.S. at 288.  
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment should extend beyond initial detention because 
there has been no judicial proceeding in the moments after arrest which affirmatively enter the 
accused into the pretrial system.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.  Initial detention does not provide the 
legal determination from a judge required to change the plaintiff’s official status from 
undergoing seizure to a pretrial detainee.  Id.; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.  The process of 
arrest and booking occur before entering the judicial system, and therefore, warrant protection 
under the Fourth Amendment, instead of the safeguards granted to pretrial detainees under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.   
Circuits in favor of applying the Fourteenth Amendment after arrest are ultimately 
unpersuasive because they depend on precedent decided before Graham, thus misapplying 
irrelevant case law.  Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.  The Fourth and Fifth Circuits base the majority of 
their reasoning on the Supreme Court case, Bell v. Wolfish, which instructs courts to analyze 
conditions of pretrial detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see, e.g., Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 (embracing the 
framework of Bell rather than extending the Fourth Amendment to pretrial detainees); Valencia, 
981 F.2d at 1445 (citing Bell as the most important basis for their application of Fourteenth 
Amendment to excess force claims); Brothers, 28 F.3d at 456-57 (relying on Valencia and Bell).  
While Bell appears to assign the Fourteenth Amendment to the gap period, Graham v. Connor, 
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decided ten years after Bell, left open the issue of which amendment applied to post-arrest, pre-
arraignment detainees. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.  Therefore, Graham implicitly overrules 
Bell, and the Fourth and Fifth Circuit’s reliance on its rationale is unfounded.   
Another pre-Graham decision rejecting the continuing seizure interpretation is the 
Seventh Circuit case, Wilkins v. May, which determined seizure ends the moment arrest is 
complete.  Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 
(1990).  One year after Graham, the Seventh Circuit decided Titran v. Ackman, and based it 
rationale for applying the Fourteenth Amendment on Wilkins.  Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 
147 (7th Cir. 1990).  However, the subsequent Graham decision has been interpreted to undercut 
Wilken’s view that seizure ends at the moment police gain custody and control over the suspect.  
Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1444 n.10; accord Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.  Furthermore, the precedent of 
Titran is uncertain at best. While the Titran court does state during the time between arrest and 
conviction the government may not punish a citizen without due process of law, the Titran court 
also affirmed the objective reasonableness standard, holding that force on a person in custody 
pending trial will track the Fourth Amendment.  Titran, 893 F.2d at 147.  This conflicting 
rationale further weakens any court’s reliance upon Titran.  
Analyzing Officer Goode’s excessive force against Radley under the continuing seizure 
approach, Radley’s rights are properly protected under the Fourth Amendment. Following the 
precedent of the Graham Court, when Radley was arrested and placed in Officer Marlin’s squad 
car, he was still undergoing seizure for purposes of his excessive force claim.  See Graham, 490 
U.S. at 389.  Radley’s arrival at the Fair County Police Station and subsequent booking did not 
end his Fourth Amendment protection because there had been no judicial process to change his 
legal status to that of a pretrial detainee.  See Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 203 (excessive force in 
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police station garage protected by the Fourth Amendment).  Therefore, the placement of Radley 
in a holding cell a few hours after his arrest, where the physical abuse occurred, should also be 
viewed as a continuation of his seizure under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Compare 
Wilson, 209 F.3d at 714 (abuse in holding cell several hours after arrest protected by Fourth 
Amendment), with Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1442 (abuse in holding cell three weeks into detention 
analyzed under Fourteenth Amendment).  
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT MANDATES PROTECTION EXTEND UNTIL 
RADLEY HAS BEEN ARRAIGNED OR FORMALLY CHARGED BECAUSE UNTIL 
IT IS DETERMINED HE WAS LAWFULLY ARRESTED, THERE HAVE BEEN NO 
EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS TO WARRANT THE DEPRIVATION OF HIS FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
A. The extension of Fourth Amendment rights until arraignment or a formal hearing 
allows for consistent protection to all arrestees who have not had a neutral 
magistrate rule on whether the state can take away their liberty, and until this 
occurs, the accused could be set free at any time before formally entering the 
pretrial system. 
 
When a citizen brings a § 1983 claim against an officer, a substantially higher hurdle 
must be surpassed to show excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment standard than under 
the objective reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864-65.  
Therefore, a pretrial detainee who has their official abuse analyzed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment effectively has less constitutional protection against excessive force than an arrestee 
who is protected under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  The lowering of rights is constitutionally 
permissible after a probable cause hearing, since there has been a judicial determination of a 
potential legal violation which justifies an extended restraint of liberty.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 536.  
Prior to a formal hearing, the arrestee has not yet entered the pretrial system because the state has 
not presented the required evidence to warrant an indictment.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.  It is 
logically inconsistent with this Nation’s concept of justice to lower someone’s rights after they 
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are arrested to that of a pretrial detainee when it is possible the accused could be released before 
charges are filed.  Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043. 
Placing the dividing line for Fourth Amendment protection at a probable cause hearing or 
arraignment adheres to precedent and the judicial goals of protecting citizens from unfounded 
invasions of liberty and privacy.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
111 (1975)).  The Supreme Court previously acknowledged this division, holding for 
constitutional purposes, an arrestee becomes a pretrial detainee after they obtain a judicial 
determination of probable cause.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 536.  A probable cause hearing or 
arraignment is a legal proceeding that affects the official status of an arrestee by constitutionally 
authorizing his detention throughout the proceedings against him.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.  The 
requisite change in legal status is not accomplished by merely arresting a citizen or placing him 
in a jail cell.  Id.   
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts recognized the Fourth Amendment as 
extending protection until arraignment or a probable cause hearing in the absence of a warrant. 
See, e.g., Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866 (warrantless arrestee in gap period protected by Fourth 
Amendment); Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043 (Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional 
limitation on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the arrestee is 
released or found to be in legal custody based upon probable cause for arrest); Austin, 945 F.2d 
at 1160 (protection of Fourth Amendment extends until person is taken before a magistrate judge 
or other judicial official to determine probable cause).  These circuits agreed a judicial discovery 
from a neutral magistrate, determining the accused is properly held pursuant to legal evidence, is 
necessary to end Fourth Amendment rights.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864 n.6.  Examining other areas 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, these circuits also were persuaded in extending Fourth 
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Amendment rights to citizens after initial seizure, by both the duration of arrest and necessity of 
probable cause for detention, concluding the Fourth Amendment’s protection logically imposes 
restriction on the treatment of an arrestee who is detained without a warrant.   Austin, 945 F.2d at 
1160; accord Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.  
It is noteworthy that the circuits most strongly rejecting the continuing seizure approach 
applied the Fourteenth Amendment in cases where the detainees were arrested pursuant to a valid 
warrant. In Riley v. Dorton, the Fourth Circuit explicitly conceded the plaintiff was arrested 
pursuant outstanding warrants, and therefore, the probable cause hearing rule established by the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits was inapplicable.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 1164 n.1.  Additionally, in the 
Fifth Circuit’s leading excessive force cases, the plaintiffs were also arrested with a valid 
warrant.  Brothers, 28 F.3d at 454; accord Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1442.  This precedent shows 
other circuit’s acknowledgement of the importance of a probable cause hearing before 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 1164 n.1. Cf. Titran, 893 F.2d at 
145 (finding Fourteenth Amendment applies to arrestee in gap period being held without a 
warrant).   
The abuse Radley suffered from Officer Goode occurred before a probable cause hearing 
or arraignment. Radley was arrested without a valid warrant; therefore, at the time of the 
excessive force, no judge had made the independent determination that Radley should be entered 
into the pretrial system.  See, e.g., Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866; Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043; Austin, 945 
F.2d at 1160.  Depriving Radley’s Fourth Amendment rights would be pre-emptive, and 
judgment of his legal status cannot be compared to cases where detainees already had a judicial 
determination of probable cause.  See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1164 n.1.  Thus, Radley’s Fourth 
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Amendment rights should extend until he had been arraigned or attended a probable cause 
hearing. See Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043. 
B. This Court should reject the Fifteenth Circuit’s arresting officer requirement as a 
bright line rule because its application is arbitrary and irrelevant to the 
constitutional rights of arrestees. 
 
The Fifteenth Circuit, in an attempt to establish a bright line rule, adopted the arresting 
officer rule which extends Fourth Amendment protection to arrestees as long as they are in the 
presence of the arresting officer.  However, the Fifteenth Circuit in affirming the district court’s 
opinion never provided any rationale to support their decision on this issue, beyond their desire 
to set a clear constitutional standard. While this is a valid goal, the adoption of a bright line rule 
must be precedented on some constitutional basis to justify the change in citizens’ rights.  Riley, 
115 F.3d at 1164.    
The arresting officer rule escapes this basic logic and arbitrarily picks a meaningless 
point in time to determine a citizen’s rights, instead of the moment when their legal status 
changes.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.  In Riley v. Dorton, the court declined to adopt the arresting 
officer rule, claiming that besides lacking textual and precedential support, the rule’s effect 
would cause Fourth Amendment coverage to depend upon the fortuity of how long an arresting 
officer happens to remain with a suspect.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 1164.  Since the legal status of the 
victim governs what amendment is applied in excessive force claims, it would be irrational for 
Fourth Amendment rights to depend solely on law enforcement protocol, since the arresting 
officer’s presence has no influence on a detainee’s legal status.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 866.   
Additionally, the arresting officer rule aggravates the current problem created by the 
circuit court split: unequal application of the law. There can be no greater interference of liberty 
than applying the Constitution differently to arrestees in similar situations.  Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 
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193.  Depending on the custom of a particular police administration, the arresting officer could 
leave immediately after arrest or continue to stay with the arrestee throughout the booking 
process.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 1164.  Thus, two arrestees abused during the same point in time 
during seizure could have their constitutional rights differ merely because the arresting officer in 
one case momentarily left.  Id.   
While several circuits applied the Fourth Amendment in cases where the arresting officer 
was present during the abuse, these cases are not indicative of a strong precedent supporting the 
arresting officer rule.  See, e.g., Wilson, 209 F.3d at 714; Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 203; Austin, 945 
F.2d at 1157.  The Second Circuit is the only circuit that explicitly adopted the arresting officer 
rule as a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment protection.  Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044.  In 
Powell v. Gardner, the Second Circuit held the Fourth Amendment standard should be applied at 
least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged and 
remains in sole or joint custody of the arresting officer.  Id.  However, in their articulation of the 
arresting officer rule, the Second Circuit acknowledged the necessity of a formal hearing for 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Id.  In Powell, the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a court 
issued warrant; therefore a formal hearing had already occurred prior to the abuse.  Id. at 1041.  
Thus, the Powell court’s opinion cannot be viewed as requiring the presence of the arresting 
officer as the sole factor courts look to when determining Fourth Amendment application. 
The Third and Eighth Circuit Courts applied the Fourth Amendment to plaintiffs abused 
while in the presence of their arresting officer.  Compare Wilson, 209 F.3d at 714 (arresting 
officer abused arrestee in jail cell), with Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 203 (excessive force 
administered by arresting officer after arrival at police station).   However, in both circuits the 
courts’ opinions never mentioned the arresting officer rule as justification for Fourth Amendment 
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protection. Instead, the Third and Eighth Circuits’ rationale focused on embracing the continuing 
seizure interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, holding Fourth Amendment protection extended 
to excessive force occurring after the arrestee arrived at the police station.  Wilson, 209 F.3d at 
716; accord Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 206.  Due to the opinions’ lack of analysis regarding the 
arresting officer rule, it can be inferred that the Third and Eighth Circuits’ application of the 
Fourth Amendment was primarily based on their constitutional interpretation that a plaintiff 
abused at a police station is still undergoing seizure, rather than the fact the arrestee happened to 
be still in the custody of the arresting officer.  Wilson, 209 F.3d at 716; accord Johnstone, 107 
F.3d at 206.   
Even if the arresting officer rule is applied in Radley’s case, its application to end his 
Fourth Amendment rights is unfounded. The Fifteenth Circuit overlooked the fact that Officer 
Marlin, the arresting officer, was still present at the police station and in joint custody of Radley 
during the time of his abuse.  See Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044 (Fourth Amendment standard applies 
while arrestee remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer).  Joint custody of an 
inmate allows for two officers to control an arrestee, but gives each the freedom to briefly leave 
to further assist in efficient booking of an inmate.  See id. at 1041.  When Officer Marlin and 
Radley arrived at the police station, Radley was temporarily transferred into Officer Goode’s 
custody. Goode then verbally abused Radley during the booking process and excessively 
tightened his handcuffs. Officer Marlin returned a short time later and proceeded to loosen 
Radley’s handcuffs, thus asserting his continuing control over the conditions of Radley’s seizure.  
See Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043.  After Marlin left the room again, Goode physically abused Radley 
after placing him in a holding cell.  
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The mere fact that Goode was the only officer present during both instances of abuse 
does not indicate that Marlin released his control over Radley.  See, e.g., Powell, 891 F.2d at 
1041 (arresting officer temporarily transferred custody of arrestee to desk sergeant for the 
booking process, after log-in was complete the arresting officer regained physical control over 
arrestee); Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161 (non-arresting officer took accused to police station, after 
booking the arresting officer regained custody to transport accused to jail); Wilson, 209 F.3d at 
714 (arresting officer allowed another officer to transport arrestee to jail, upon arrival both 
officers participated in booking).  Marlin was in close physical proximity to Radley at all times 
in the police station and gave no indication of being relieved of his responsibility to Radley.  See 
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1041 (although non-arresting officer was processing arrestee, arresting 
officer was nearby in the same building to quickly regain custody once log-in was complete).  
This was exemplified when Marlin returned to check on Radley after a brief period of time and 
immediately took care of his request for looser cuffs, instead of deferring this job to Officer 
Goode. Thus, this Court could interpret from the facts that when Radley experienced excessive 
force at the police station, he was still in the joint custody of his arresting officer.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to reverse the Fifteenth Circuit’s decision and 
find that Radley’s Fourth Amendment rights extended until he was arraigned or attended a 
probable cause hearing. This Court should find that Fourth Amendment rights extend beyond 
initial seizure by adopting the continuing seizure approach in excessive force cases, which will 
allow this Court to remain faithful to the Framer’s intended protection under the Fourth 
Amendment and provide arrestees with consistent protection until a judicial determination enters 
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them into the pretrial system. In determining when Fourth Amendment protection ends, this 
Court should place a bright line when the arrestee attends a formal hearing, which would allow a 
magistrate to rationally conclude whether an arrestee should be further detained or released 
before lowering the arrestee’s rights from the Fourth Amendment to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Rejecting the arresting officer rule in favor of a formal hearing standard will not only promote 
consistent application of the law, but will also allow the change in an arrestee’s rights to depend 
upon a legal proceeding instead of a fortuitous event.   
PRAYER 
 
For these reasons, Petitioner prays this Court reverse the decision of the court below and 
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